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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LLOYD E. LISH, JR., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMP-
ANY, a Maine Corporation, 
Defendant-Appe1lant. 
Case No. 
12474 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action for personal injuries received 
by plaintiff allegedly sustained when he brought a 
metal pole he was holding in his hands in contact with 
defendant's power line. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Calvin 
Gould sitting with a jury. From a verdict and judg-
ment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
2 
judgment in its favor as a matter of l:wv, or that fail 
ing, a new trial. 
FACTS 
On the morning of February 28, 1969, plaintift 
\Vent to a grain bin owned by \ 1Villard R. Smith, Jr. 
(Tr. 262) . Plaintiff went to the bin to obtain ()'rail 
~ 
samples in connection with his occupation as a grair 
buyer and trucker (Tr. 93). The grain bin was loeatt 
in Holbrook, Idaho, which is very sparsely populateil 
farming village with few buildings (Tr. 246). Tl1 
temperature on the date in question was very cold (Tr 
96). 
After arriving at the bin plaintiff parked his pid 
up truck just off the highway approximately undt· 
defendant's power lines (Tr. 96). He then got outo1 
his truck and took four (Tr. 212, 236) three foot (T' 
57) sections of a probe rod out of a gunny sack (Tr 
97). The gunny sack contained twelve three foot st 
tions (Tr. 97). Plaintiff then proceeded to climb upH 
side of the bin and into the bin.Once inside he assembk 
the four sections of probe and then attached an et 
probe section, which was approximately fifteen incite 
in length, to the rod and proceeded to take grain sampl 
(Tr. 98). Upon completion of collecting grain samplr· 
plaintiff decided not to disassemble the probe rod k 
cause he was planning to use the rod at another'. 
located nearby (Tr. 99, 100). Plaintiff then proceei:c 
to climb back up out of the bin. \Vhen he reached 11 
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top, he put one leg over the edge of the bin while leav-
ing the other in the bin (Tr. 100). He then J_: u!led the 
approximately thirteen foot metal rod out of the bin. 
In pulling the assembled rod from the bin plaintiff 
brought the probe in contact with defendant's power 
line and received injuries as a result of touching the 
line ( Tr. 100) . 
Plaintiff was familiar with the bin and the road 
upon which the line was located and, in fact, had purchas-
ed grain from "\\7 illard Smith on previous occasions (Tr. 
172). He had traveled the road on which the bin was 
located on many occasions and was aware of the utility 
poles (Tr. 176) along the side of the road and of the 
power lines on the poles ( Tr.188). There was also un-
' disputed evidence that the lines themselves were bright 
(Tr. 277), and plaintiff testified that he hail twenty-
! twenty vision at the time of the accident (Tr. 188). 
1 Plaintiff indicated that he was aware of the danger 
involved in touching power lines (Tr. 187, 193). Not-
withstanding these factors plaintiff did not pay partic-
, ular attention to the utility poles before climbing up the 
sideofthebin (Tr.176). 
The probe rod used by plaintiff was over thirteen 
feet long (Tr. 236, 57) and could have been increased 
r to a length of forty (Tr. 175) or fifty feet (Tr. 57) · 
The probe rod could have been easily disassembled be-
fore plaintiff left the bin, but it was not disassembled 
for plaintiff's convenience (Tr. 99). As a matter of fact 
Galen Christensen who was plaintiff's partner in tk 
grain business testified that he told his employees to 
dismantle the probe on top of grain bins if they could 
(Tr. 66). 
The evidence indicated that the nearest charged 
wire to the bin was at least 9.01 feet (Tr. 10) away 
and was likely more than 9.77 feet (Tr. 285) from the 
bin on the day of the accident since it was extremely 
cold day and the wires contract in cold weather (Tr. 
286). The wires were 28 feet from the ground (Tr. 
286) and each of the three charged wires vrns carrying 
7200 volts (Tr. 284, 296). 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TRIUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LA'"r. 
This Court has clearly established that where a 
plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence he may 
not recover from defendant. Defendant contends that 
under the facts established at trial, plaintiff negligently 
contributed to his own injuries and is therefore barred 
from recovery from defendant. 
The evidence established that plaintiff was familiar 
with the area, the utility poles and the power lines. In 
fact, plaintiff admits at Tr. 188 that a person wou~d 
have to be blind not to see the power lines. After com-
pleting his work in the bin plaintiff pulled his 13 foot 
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probe out of the bin without watching where it was 
going and negligently allowed it to come in contact 
with the power line. 
Plaintiff could have easily avoided this accident 
by either disassembling the probe before leaving the bin 
or by watching where the probe was going as it was 
being pulled from the bin. 
This Court has previously dealt with the question 
of contributory negligence in connection with electrical 
equipment. In the case of Koch v. Telluride Power Co., 
116 Utah 237, 209 P.2d 241 ( 1949), this Court held that 
contributory negligence may bar recovery against an 
electric company for personal injuries caused by elect-
rical equipment. 
This Court has also been explicit in denying re-
coYery in other situations where plaintiffs have been 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
In the case of Johnson v. Syme, 6 Utah 2d 319, 
313 P .2d 468 ( 1957), plaintiff was held guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiff, 
while driving on a four-lane highway, collided with a 
car which, with headlights burning, was driving onto 
the highway from an intersecting road without stopping 
for a stop sign. The plaintiff admitted that she did 
not see the defendant's car until it was directly in front 
of her at a distance of twenty to thirty feet. This Court 
stated that: 
6 
Under such circumstances we cannot but con-
clude that plaintiff either looked and failed to 
see the obvious or failed to look at all and as a 
matter of law negligently contributed to her 
own in.juries and the death of another motor-
ist. In other circumstances of negligent failure 
to look or to see that which is there to be seen, 
where the facts were no stronger than those 
here, we have concluded, as we do here, that 
there was contributory negligence as a matter 
of law which precluded recovery. (Emphasis 
added) Johnson at 469. 
In Richards v. Anderso11, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2rl 
59 ( 1959), the trial court granted summary judgment 
against the plaintiff on the grounds that he was contrih-
utory negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff was 
traveling on Highway U.S. 40 when the defendant 
entered the intersection in front of him. This Court stat-
ed that: 
It is a well settled rule that one may not be 
heard to say that he did not see >what was plain 
to be seen. He either failed to look or saw and 
failed to heed, either of which makes him negli-
gent. (Emphasis added) Richards at 61. 
In the case of Whitman v. JV. 'I'. Grant Co., 16 
Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964), the plaintiff was 
held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. The plaintiff, a truck driver, while making a de-
livery opened a door and stepped off backward into an 
elevator shaft without looking. This Court affirming 
the trial court stated that: 
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The plaintiff is confronted with the basic 
proposition that when there is a hazard ''"hieh 
is plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged 
with the duty of seeing and avoiding it and if 
he fails to do so, it is concluded that he is negli-
gent either in failing to look, or in failing to 
heed what he saw. TiJThit111an at 920. 
* * * 
He (the plaintiff) appears to have violated 
the sound and of ten echoed dictum which 
arises out of experience and common sense to 
"watch where you are going" when no excuse 
was shown for his failure to do so. (Emphasis 
added) Whitman at 920-921. 
In the case of Mc.Allister v. Bybee, 19 Utah 2d 
40, 42.5 P.2d 778 ( 1967), the plaintiff alighted from 
her car along the curb of a Kanab City street and was 
injured when she fell over something in the unpaved, 
ireedy area between the curb and sidewalk. She initially 
said she did not know what caused her to stumble and 
fall. Finally, however, she attributed the accident to a 
cement anchor used many years before to hold up a 
pole supporting a canopy in connection with a seni 
station, which, with the pole, had been removed many 
)'ears before. Mrs. l\JcAllister had known of the cement 
anchor which was about six or eight inches above the 
ground, and had seen it there for many years. In ruling 
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a 
niatter of law, this Court stated: 
... Even had there been no speculation as to 
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whether she tripped over the cement obstruct-
ion, she had known of its existence for many 
years, that it was in plain sight on a clear 
day-and there to see if anyone but looked. 
This court consistently has said that under such 
circumshmces there ~ould be a defense on the 
ground of contributory negligence .... 31c-
Allister at 779. 
In the case of Eisner 'l'. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah 
675, 238 P.2d 416 (1951), plaintiff was walking along 
a dry sidewalk on a clear day and was aware of and had 
an unobstructed view of a hole in the sidewalk in front 
of her. Just as she approached the hole her attention 
was distracted by a large group of children and as a 
consequence she stepped into the hole and fell breaking 
her wrist. The court held that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law because 
even though her attention was distracted, she knew of 
the danger and her behavior fell short of the standards 
attributable to the reasonably prudent man. 
Other jurisdictions that have dealt with the question 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in cases 
involving power lines have denied recovery in fact situa-
tions similar to the one presented here by plaintiff. 
In the case of Hale v. 3'lontana-Dakota Utililics 
Co., 192 F.2d 27 4 (8th Cir., 1951), plaintiff was 
acting as a rodman with a surveying crew. He was 
using a surveying rod which was constructed in sections. 
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When the rod was fully extended it was fifteen feet 
in length, but it could easily be collapsed to a length 
of five or six feet. In attempting to set the rod in a 
vertical position he touched defendant's power line and 
was seriously injured. In holding that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
the court made the following observations: 
But we think there is another conclusive reason 
why the court did not err in directing a ver-
dict for the defendant. According to his own 
testimony plaintiff was well aware of the pres-
ence of these overhanging wires. He knew 
that they were conductors of electricity, carry-
ing high voltage. He was a mature and intell-
igent young man and knew the dangerous nat-
ure of electricity, and one with knowledge of 
the nature and characteristics of electricity and 
the danger arising from contact with its con-
ductors is charged with the same degree of 
care as is the company producing and trans-
mitting it and failure to exercise such care by 
a plaintiff seeking to recover constitutes con-
tributory negligence on his part. * * * 
Knowing the presence of these lines and the 
danger arising from contcat with them, ord-
inary care required either that he shorten the 
rod to five or six feet or place it to one side 
of the lines. There 'tms no necessity of bring-
ing it directly under these lines and the failure 
to take any precaution whatever constituted 
negligence as a matter of law, and we think 
10 
reasonable men could not differ in this con-
clusion. 
* * * 
In affirming a directed verdict for the def end-
ant the court said [82 P.2d 968]: Plaintiff 
was in no danger at all until he raised the rod 
to the height of the wires. He knew the wires 
were somewhere above him. He did not ascer-
tain their exact location. He did not know if 
the wires were insulated. He could have deter-
mined this fact by simply looking at them. He 
did not look at what was in plain sight. This 
unfortunate young man simply 'took a chance' 
and was terribly injjured." (Emphasis added) 
Hale at 28. 
In Hamilton v. So1tthern Nevada Power Co., 273 
P.2d 760 (Nev., 1954), plaintiff was held guilty of 
contributory negligence when he touched a power line 
that was in plain view six to eight feet above his head 
with an iron pipe he was raising from a well. Plaintiff 
and his father both knew the wires were there but they 
paid little attention to them. 
In the case of Southern IJiaryland Electric Co-
operative v. Blanchard, 212 A.2d 801 (l\1d., 1965). 
plaintiff was held to have been contributorily negligenl 
in bringing a television antenna he was installing in 
contact with electrical wires. Plaintiff claimed that lie 
did not know the wires were there, but the court held 
that he was chargeable with knowing they ·were ther 
in view of the fact that he had lived there 
11 
for one month and was working directly under the wires 
~t the time of the accident. 
For other cases in which courts have held plaintiffs 
guilty of contributory negligence for touching power 
lines see Smith v. Virginia Electric and Power Comp-
any, 129 S.E. 2d 655 (Va., 1963); Dresser v. Southern 
California Edison Co., 82 P.2d 965 (Cal., 1938); and 
May v. Illinois Power Co., 96 N.E.2d 631 (Ill., 1951). 
A section from C.J.S. also states the standards for 
finding contributory negligence when one is injured by 
a power line : 
One who has notice of the dangerous condition 
of a wire or other electrical appliance and 
voluntarily or recklessly brings himself into 
contact with it, as by touching it with conduct-
ors of electricity, is guilty of negligence, and 
cannot hold the company for the resulting 
injuries, and this is true of any adult, although 
he is wholly unskilled in the handling of elec-
tricity. To ~ive rise to this defense, however, 
it must be shown that plaintiff in coming into 
contact with the appliances voluntarily and un-
necessarily or negligently exposed himself to 
danger. 
To constitute want of due care on his part it is 
not required that he should have anticipated 
the exa.'ct risk which occurred or that the peril 
was a deadly one, it is sufficient that he placed 
himself in a position of known danger where 
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there was no need for him to be or that he 
knew or should have known that substantial 
injury was likely to result from his acts. 29 
C.J.S., Electricity, Sec. 53 ( 1965). 
Because plaintiff negligently and carelessly allowed 
his probe to come in contact with the power lines, this 
Court should find him guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
JURY INSTRUCTION NU l\1 BER 
FOURTEEN WAS ERRONEOUS AND 
PREJUDICIAL. 
Jury instruction number fourteen was given over 
defendant's objection (Tr. 316, 317) and was erroneous 
and prejudicial. This instruction was argumentatiYe. 
inflamatory, biased in plaintiff's favor and was not a 
correct instruction of law. 
Jury instruction number fourteen as stated in the 
Instructions to the Jury starting on page R. 28 std 1 • 
that: 
You are instructed that a high tension trans-
mission wire is one of the most dangerous 
things known to man. Not only is the current 
deadly, but the danger is hidden away in an 
innocent-looking wire ready at all times to kill 
or injure anyone who touches it or comes too 
near it. For the average citizen, there is no way 
of knowing whether the wire is harmless or 
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lethal until it is too late to do anything about 
it. Therefore, a high clegree of c1uty is imposed 
upon one who trammits electricity in high ten-
sion wires to see that no harm befalls a person 
rightfully in proximity thereto when that per-
son is himself guilty of no wrongdoing. In 
other words, the highest degree of care must 
be used to prevent harm from coming to 
others. 
Failure to comply with this duty by Utah 
Power and Light Company would be negli-
gence. 
Defendant contends that this was an improper in-
struction in that it was not a mere instruction on the 
law, but in the context of this trial was an inflamatory 
instruction which editorialized and argued the dangers 
of high tension transmission wires. The instruction 
would also have been confusing to the jury in that at one 
point it states that " ... a high degree of duty is upon 
one who transmits electricity ... " and in another place 
the instruction states ". . . the highest degree of care 
must be used ... " If the highest degree of care is re-
quired, it implies a strict liability on the part of one 
who transmits electricity, and this Court has expressly 
held that strict liability does not apply in the case of 
electrical transmissions. Brigham v. IJ!oon Lake Electric 
Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970). 
The entire instruction was slanted against the de-
fendant and had the effect of depriving the defend-
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ant of a fair trial and was prejudicial in that it 
emphasized in several biased ways the nature of trans-
mission wires. 
One authority states that it is error to appeal to 
the sympathies and prejudices of the jury: 
A litigant has a right to a trial by a fair and 
and impartial jury, whose consideration of his 
cause is not influenced by any language of 
the court which would create re<>entment or pre-
judice against him. Thus, it is error for the 
court in its charge improperly to appeal to 
the sympathies and prejudices of the jury, 
and requested instructinns containing such 
appeals are properly refused. However, the 
mere fact that a statement of matters, other-
wise proper to be taken into account by the 
jury, may create sympathy in favor of one 
party or the other does not render such state-
ment erroneous. 88 C.J.S., Trial, Sec 343 
(1955). 
Apparently plaintiff's counsel took the language 
of this instruction verbatum from this Court's decision 
in the Brigham case, supra. In that case plaintiff, his 
father, two brothers and a neighbor boy went searching 
for indian arrowheads in an isolated area. Plaintiff and 
his fifteen year old brother came upon a grounded wire 
which the brother touched with no harm. Plaintiff asked 
his brother if they 'vere electric wires and was told that 
they were not. In going under the wire, plaintiff reach-
15 
ed up and touched the charged wire and was severely 
injured. 
The language contained in Lish's instruction was 
taken from an introductory comment made by this 
Court prior to stating that Moon Lake Electric Assoc-
iation was not strictly liable. The comment was clearly 
dictum and should not have been offered by Lish as a 
statement of the law or the holding of the case. 
It is also important to note that these two cases are 
factually different in that Brigham saw the wire and 
deliberately touched it. Also the wire was near the ground 
where it could be touched by anyone who walked by. 
Defendant contends it was prejudicial error for the 
trial court to permit an inflamatory instruction to be 
lifted out of context from dictum in a case that was 
factually different from the one then at bar. 
In the case of Ireland v. Mitchell, 359 P.2d 894 
(Ore., 1961), the Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
A trial judge is not a mere automaton whose 
function is limited to reciting the words ap-
proved by statute or by the Supreme Court. 
On the contrary, it is not advisable in charging 
the jury to use the exact words of an appel-
late court opinion in stating the law in similar 
cases. Mason v. Allen et al., 183 Or. 638, 645. 
195 P.2d 717. The judge must preside over 
the trial. His office calls for the exercise of 
an informed intellect. Ireland at 897. 
Def enclant also contends that jury instruction num-
16 
ber fourteen was erroneous and prejudicial in that it was 
argumentative. Not only is the language of this instruc-
tion argumentatiYe, but it is also to be noted that plaint-
iff's counsel prejudicially emphasized this instruction 
by reading the entire instruction to the jury both in hi, 
closing argument and again in his rebuttal to defendant's 
closing argument. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states in part: 
Argument for the respective parties shall be 
made after the court has instructed the jury. 
The court shall not comment on the evidence 
in the case, and if the court statess any of the 
evidence, it must instruct the jury that they 
are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
fact. 
Defendant contends that by giving jury instruction 
number fourteen the trial court violated Rule .51 in 
that the instruction constituted argument during the 
instructing of the jury and that it constituted comment-
ing on the evidence. One authority clearly states that 
argumentative instructions are objectionable: 
Argument, which lies properly within the do-
main of counsel in the case, finds no place in 
instructions of the court. A court should not 
O"ive, and mav pro1)erlv ref use, argumentatiYe 0 • • 
instructions. But the giving of such a charge 
is not ground for reversal, unless prejudice 
to the party complaining results. 
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A charge is objectionable as being argument-
ati,·e when it direct<> the jury to look to or con-
sider certain facts as tending tmrnrd certain 
conclu5ions, or when it suggests to the jury 
the probable or possible effect of the conduct 
of one person toward another. 53 Am. J ur., 
Trial, Sec 552 ( 1945). 
In the case of State v. BrM.c:n, 39 Utah 140, ll.5 P. 
994 ( 19ll), this Court held that an instruction that is 
argumentative is properly refused. The defendant had 
been charged with passing a forged instrument, and at 
trial several instructions relating to defendant's char-
acter were refused. In a concurrmg opm10n. Chief 
Justice Frick stated that: 
... The italicized portion of the charge which 
was refused by the court, while it, in legal 
effect, embodies the principle of law I have 
outlined above, also contained matter which, 
in my judgment, was improper if not vicious. 
Much of what is sai<l in that portion of the 
charge is mere argument and does not state a 
proper legal principle. Broton at 1002. 
The Brown court also stated another principle of 
the law that is relenmt to the arguments found in this 
Point as well as Point III and Point IV, infra. 
The general rule, of course, is that every error 
is prima facie an injury to the party against 
whom it is made; and that where error is 
shown injury is presumed, and that it had an 
effect upon the result of the trial, unless the 
18 
record affirmatively shows the contrary, or. 
not that probably no harm was done, but that 
no harm could have been or was done by the 
committed error. Brown at 1001. · 
The case of JJfilford Canning Company v. Central 
Illinois Public Service Company, 188 N.E.2d 397 (Ill., 
1963), also dealt with an argumentative instruction. 
Plaintiff's claim was based on damages suffered from 
an interruption of electrical service. During the trial 
the court refused an instruction submitted by defendant 
because the court ruled it was argumentative. In sus· 
taining the trial court, the appellate court said: 
Complaint is made that the court erred in re-
fusing defendant's instruction 4, which charg-
ed that "defendant was not an insurer or a 
guarantor * * * but * * * *." This instruction 
is argumentative in that it emphasizes that de-
fendant was not an jnsurer, and minimizes its 
duty to exercise ordinary care. 1J11ilford Can-
ning at 400. 
Jury instruction number 14 is likewise argument· 
ative in that it argues the dangers of power lines and 
points out that the danger is hidden until it is too late. 
Such language may have been appropriate for plaint· 
iff's closing argument but certainly not for an instruct· 
ion from the court. 
19 
POINT III 
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
THIRTEEN,VASERRONEOUSAND 
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT. 
Jury instruction number thirteen was given to the 
jury over defendant's objection (Tr. 316). Said in-
struction states: 
You are instructed that fhe State of Idaho has 
adopted National Bureau of Standards Hand-
book 81 entitled Safety Rules for the Instal-
lation and JYiaintenance of Electric Supply 
and Communication Lines regulating the con-
struction and operation of electrical power 
lines. You are further instructed that Section 
234.C. (b) provides in part as follows: 
"GUARDING OF SUPPLY CON-
DUCTORS. Supply conductors of 300 
volts or more shall be properly guarded 
by grounded conduit, barriers, or other-
wise, under the following conditions: . . . 
( 2) Where such conductors are placed 
near enough to windows, verandas, 
fire escapes, or other ordinarily acces-
sible places, to be exposed to contract 
by persons." 
If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant violated the regula-
tion above which is designed for the safety of 
the plaintiff and other persons engaged in 
similar activities, such conduct would be negli-
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gence on the part of defendant Utah Power 
and Light Company. (Emphasis added) 
This instruction was erroneous and prejmli;ial 
for two independent reasons. In the first plare, the 
trial court refused to include with this instruction the 
definition of "guarded". The definition of "guarded" 
was read to the jury during the course of the trial (Tr. 
307) and was discussed at trial. The definition of "guard· 
ed" is an intregal and essential part of said section an,J 
it is necessary in order to properly interpret the section. 
In other words, the jury was given only a part of the 
section. The part of the code which defines "guarded" 
and that was not given defines "guarded" as: 
Guarded means covered, shielded, fenced, en-
closed, or otherwise protected by means of 
suitable covers or casings, barrier, rails, or 
screens, matter or platf arms, to remove the li-
ability of dangerous contract or approach by 
persons or objects to the point of danger (Tr. 
307). 
The code goes on to indicate that if a wire is insu· 
lated but otherwise unprotected, it is not considered as 
"guarded" (Tr. 307). 
It is defendant's contention that the jury could 
not properly interpret this provision without knoking 
what "guarded" meant. As it was, they were left to 
their own interpretations as to how defendant shoulu 
have guarded the power lines in question. They may 
well have conceived the duty on the defendant to haYe 
been greater than it was. 
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Defendant believes that this instruction was in· 
complete and in a se1~sc taken out of context thereby 
prejudicing def edant. 
Defendant secondly contends that this instruction 
should not have been given to the jury at all because 
the facts of the case had determined that it was not 
applicable. 
It is first to be noted that according to the applic-
able code provision, these wires were more than the 
required distance from the bin even if, as the plaintiff 
contended, the voltage involved were 12,500 volts (Tr. 
295, 296). The code provided that if the voltage in 
question were 12,500 volts then the wires would ha"' 
to be at least eight diagonal feet from the bin. As was 
stated in the Facts, supra, these wires were at least 9.01 
feet from the bin. 
It should also be noted that part ( 1) of this section 
requires "guarding" when the wires cannot be remon•: 
from buildings by the distances required by the code. It 
therefore would appear that this section requires "guard-
ing" when wires cannot for any reason be kept out of 
the reach of persons when they are in "ordinarily acces-
sible p1aces". Plaintiff could not have touched the wi1 1 
with his person and was therefore in no danger until 
he began waving a thirteen foot metal rod arounrl t 1 
lop of the bin. Since this probe could have been extend-
l'd to at least forty feet and since the ground under 
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the wires is certainly an "ordinaril7 accessible p1ace". 
the instruction might imply that defendant had a duty 
to guard the wires all the wa~r through Holbrook, Idaho. 
since they could be reached from the ground. It is to 
be remembered in this regard that Holbrook was a small 
sparsley populated village with few buildings. 
"\Vhen it is kept in mind that these wires could not 
have been properly "guarded" by insulating them, the 
inapplicability of this section becomes more apparent. 
Defendant would have been required to encase all of 
these wires or build some suspended structure arournl 
these wires to comply with this section. This is not a 
reasonable interpretation of the section. 
Even if the section and facts are viewed in a light 
most favorable to plaintiff, the applicability of thi5 
code section to these facts should have been a question 
for the jury. However, because the instruction state1 
that " ... which is designed for the safety of the plaint-
iff ... ", the jury could conclude that the court had 
ruled as a matter of law that the section was binding on 
defendant and that a violation was negligence (see Point 
IV). Such an impression on the part of the jury "·mild 
certainly be prejudicial to defendant. 
POINT IV 
JURY INSTRUCTION NU MR ER 
SEYENTEEN "\VAS ERRONEOUS 
AND PREJUDICIAL TO DEFEND-
ANT. 
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Jury instruction number seventeen was given to 
the jury over defendant's objection (Tr. 317). Said 
instruction stated: 
llefore you can return a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that each of the following two 
propositions arc true: 
PROPOSITION NO. 1: 
That the defendant was negligent in one or 
more of the following particulars: 
A. In failing to comply with the National 
Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 81 re-
lating to guarding of supply conductors; or 
B. Failing to warn the public of a hazard-
ous condition. 
PROPOSITION NO. 2: 
That the said negligence of the defendant, if 
any, was the proximate cause of the injury. 
If you find that the two foregoing proposit-
ions are true, you should then consider the 
issue of contributory negligence as later de-
fined in these instructions. 
The thrust of this instruction was that if the jury 
found that defendant was guilty of either A or B under 
proposition number one and either was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injury, defendant was to be found 
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liable barring contributory negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff. Defendant conten<ls that hoth A and E 
under proposition number one are erroneous instructiorn 
and obviously prejudicial to defendant. 
Proposition No. IA was erroneous for the reasons 
set forth in Point III, supra. 
Jury instruction number seventeen is further er-
roneous and prejudicial in that proposition No. Ill 
instructed the jury that defendant had a duty to warn 
the public of a hazardous condition. There was no eri-
dence whatever introduced that indicated that the de-
fendant did have a duty or that if such duty was owe<l. 
how that duty was to be fulfilled. This instruction was 
totally without foundation and is contrary to the law 
under these circumstances. 
Even if defendant did have a duty to warn, there was 
a complete absence of any definition or instruction to the 
jury as to what was meant by a duty to warn. That 
error was called to the attention of the trial court at 
the time the instructions were read to the jury, but be-
fore the instructions were given to the jury and before 
they retired to the jury room. This was called to th1 
court's attention by means of a handwritten instruction 
prepared by defendant (R.20) which stated that: 
There is no duty to warn of an obvious danger 
or that which is readily apparent to the ordin-
ary prudent person. 
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This instruction was refused so that the jury was 
left without any instructions as to what constituted a 
duty to warn or under what circumstances the duty arose 
or failed to arise. 
Defendant first contends that there is no duty to 
warn where there is an obvious danger. The dangers of 
coming into contact with high powered lines are so 
obvious that no warning of those dangers need be given. 
Plaintiff himself stated that he knew of the dangers of 
coming into contact with power lines and that he knew 
he would be injured if he did so. In this case there was 
no need to warn the plaintiff because he was already 
aware of the facts that any warning would have contain-
ed. 
Defendant secondly contends that the law imposes 
no such duty to warn under these circumstances. In the 
case of Berry v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad Company, 
273 F.2d 572 (4th Cir., 1960), the decedent was elect-
rocuted while assisting in the unloading of steel from a 
railroad car when the crane being used for such unload-
ing came in contact with the defendant's power line. 
The court held that even if the defendant had been 
negligent in the placement of its power lines, still there 
would have been no duty to warn since the decedent was 
already aware of the existence, location and the dangers 
of the power line. Therefore, the court concluded warn-
ing signs could have accomplished only that which the 
crane operator already knew-that contact with the line 
should be avoided. 
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In the case of Lewis v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 
212 P .2d 243 (Cal., 1950), the court held that know-
ledge that a sewer line was being laid along a street 
beneath an overhead electric line imposed no duty on 
the electric company to warn of the high voltage line 
so as to render the company liable for the death of a 
workman electrocuted when a crane moving sewer pipe 
came in contact with the line. The court said that there 
is no duty to warn if from all of the circumstances it 
could not have been reasonably anticipated that an acei· 
dent of the general nature of that which killed the 
plaintiff would have occurred. It is to be remembered 
in this regard that the power line with which Lish came 
in contact was twenty-eight feet off the ground and a\ 
least nine feet from the grain bin. It was only when 
plaintiff negligently brought the long metal pole in 
contact with the wire that the accident occurred. This is 
not the kind of happening which an electric company 
is bound to foresee and guard against. Had the grain 
bin been full, the plaintiff would have had a much 
longer probe rod and would have still come in contact 
with an electric wire had it been even a greater distance 
from the bin. This accident occurred because of the neg· 
ligence of the plaintiff and was not one which the de· 
fendant could have anticipated. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant defendant's motion (Tr. 205) 
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for an involuntary non-suit on the ground that plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The 
trial court also committed prejudicial error in giving 
jury instructions 13, 14 and 17 and in refusing to give 
instructions regarding the duty to warn, the lack of 
necessity to give a warning concerning that which is 
obvious, and defining "guarding". If this Court does 
not grant defendant's motion for an involuntary non-
suit, it should grant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
RAMON l\f. CHILD, ESQ. 
1\1. JOHN ASHTON, ESQ. 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
